MICROECONOMÍA II
(Doctorado en Economía)
Bloque de Economía
de la Información
EJERCICIOS DE DISEÑO DE
MECANISMOS: A Entregar antes de la última clase
Prof. Carlos M.
Gómez
Lecturas Recomendadas:
Tema 1: Elección con
Incertidumbre
Lecturas de Carácter
General:
el
Capítulo 1 (Elements of decision under uncertainty) del manual de Hirshleifer,
J. and Riley, J.G. (1992).:The analytics of uncertainty and information. Cambridge
University Press. U.K. Un buen
sustituto, puede ser la primera parte de
Hirshleifer, J. and Riley, J.G. (1992).:The
analytics of uncertainty and information: an Expository Survey.
Journal of Economic Literature
Machina,
M. J (1987) Choice
under Uncertainty: Problems Solved and Unsolved. Journal of Economic Perspective, 1
(Summer 1987)pp. 121-54
Bibliografía:
- Alchian, A.A.
(1953) The Meaning of
Utility Measurement. The American Economic Review, Vol. 43, No.
1. (Mar., 1953), pp. 26-50.
- Allais, M. (1953) Le Comportement de
l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de
l'Ecole Americaine. Econometrica, Vol. 21, No. 4. (Oct., 1953), pp. 503-546.
- Baumol, W. J.
(1951) The Neumann-Morgenstern
Utility Index--An Ordinalist View. The Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 59, No. 1. (Feb., 1951), pp. 61-66
- Friedman; M.
and Savage, L. J. (1948) The Utility
Analysis of Choices Involving Risk. The Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 56, No. 4. (Aug., 1948), pp. 279-304.
- Markowitz, H. (1952) The Utility of Wealth.
The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 60, No. 2. (Apr., 1952), pp.
151-158.
- Schoemaker, P.
J. H.(1982) The Expected
Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence and Limitations. Journal
of Economic Literature, Vol. 20, No. 2. (Jun., 1982), pp. 529-563.
- Slovic, P. and
Lichtenstein, S. (1983) Preference
Reversals: A Broader Perspective. The American Economic Review,
Vol. 73, No. 4. (Sep., 1983), pp. 596-605.
§ § Tversky, A. Slovic, P. and Kahneman, D.(1990) The
Causes of Preference Reversal. The American Economic Review, Vol.
80, No. 1. (Mar., 1990), pp. 204-217
§ §
Tversky, A. and Kahneman,
D. (1991) Loss Aversion in
Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 106, No. 4. (Nov., 1991), pp.
1039-1061.
Tema 2: Economía de la
Información.
Lecturas
de Carácter General:
La
memoria de la
Academia Sueca en la que justifica la concesión del premio Nobel a : Stiglitz, Spence
y Akerlof
La
revisión de la literatura de la información en Riley. Silver Rules: Twenty Five Years
Screening and Signaling. Journal
of Economic Literature. 2001,
Junio.
Tema 3: Información
asimétrica
3.1. Información asimétrica sobre
preferencias y costes marginales: Diseño de Mecanismos
3.2. Información Asimétrica sobre
calidad: Selección adversa y Señalización.
3.3. Información Asimétrica sobre
Comportamientos: Riesgo Moral y Diseño de Contratos.
Lecturas Recomendadas:
Lecturas de Carácter
General:
§
Capítulo 8 y 11
(“Informational asymetry and contrat design” y “Competition and hidden
knowledge”) del manual de Hirshleifer, J. and Riley, J.G. (1992).:The
analytics of uncertainty and information. Cambridge University Press. U.K.
Bibliografía:
- Akerlof, G. A. (1970) The
Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, No. 3.
(Aug., 1970), pp. 488-500.
- Maskin, E. and Riley, J (1984) Monopoly with
Incomplete Information. The RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 15,
No. 2. (Summer, 1984), pp. 171-196.
- Mirrlees, J. A. (1976) The Optimal
Structure of Incentives and Authority within an Organization. The
Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 7, No. 1. (Spring, 1976), pp. 105-131.
- Riley, J. G. (1979) Informational
Equilibrium. Econometrica,
Vol. 47, No. 2. (Mar., 1979), pp.
331-360.
- Ross, S. A. (1973) The Economic Theory
of Agency: The Principal's Problem. The American Economic Review,
Vol. 63, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-fifth Annual Meeting
of the American Economic Association. (May, 1973), pp. 134-139.
- Rothschild, M. and Stiglitz, J.E. (1976) Equilibrium
in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect
Information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No.
4. (Nov., 1976), pp. 629-649.
- Spence, M (1974) Market signaling. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1974.
- Spence, M. (1973) Job Market
Signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 87, No. 3.
(Aug., 1973), pp. 355-374.
- Spence, M. and Zeckhauser, R.(1971) The
Allocation of Social Risk
Insurance, Information, and Individual Action. The American Economic Review,
Vol. 61, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the Eighty-Third Annual Meeting
of the American Economic Association. (May, 1971), pp. 380-387.
- Stiglitz, J. E. and Weiss, A. (1981) Credit Rationing in Markets
with Imperfect Information. The American Economic Review, Vol.
71, No. 3. (Jun., 1981), pp. 393-410.
- Wilson, C. A. (1977) A model of insurance markets with incomplete informatio.
Journal of economic theory, 16. pp. 167-207.
Otras lecturas
recomendadas
Gómez, C. M. (2001) On Optimal Environmental Taxation and Enforcement: Information,
Monitoring and Efficiency. Natural Resource Modeling
Vol. 14, N. 1, Spring 2001